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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the defendant Howell (who contracted with "Mr.

Rain Gutter", an independent contractor who employed Plaintiff)
have any duty toward Plaintiff since the injury suffered was the
result of an "open and obvious danger"?
2.

Even if Utah law no longer recognizes the defense

of the "open and obvious danger" under its comparative negligence
doctrine, did the Larry Howell have any duty toward Plaintiff
since he did not own the building in question, did not control it
and was not subject to the safety regulations applicable only to
the other defendants?
REPORTS OF OPINION
The subject decision has been published in 118 Utah
Adv. Rep. 64 (CA, 9/28/89).

A copy of the decision is No. 1 of

the Appendix.
JURISDICTION
1.

The decision sought to be reviewed was entered on

September 28, 1989.
2.

There has been no order respecting a rehearing and

an order granting an extension of time for one day was entered
herein on October 30, 1989.
3.

No cross petition has been filed.

4.

Jurisdiction of this court is invoked on the basis

of Section 78-2-2(3,a) U.C.A. 1953.

5

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF EXPRESS LAW
There are no controlling provisions of express law.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This case involves personal injuries suffered by an
employee of "Mr. Rain Gutter", an independent contractor who
undertook to install a rain gutter on a building erected by a
general contractor who came in contact with a high voltage wire
which was too close to the building.

Suit was filed against the

utility company, the building contractor, the materials supplier
(Howell), the building owner and operator.

Plaintiff settled as

to the utility company and the general contractor.

The Court

granted summary judgment motions as to the other defendants.

The

Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that the existence of an
"open and obvious danger" did not relieve the defendants of their
duty to either elevate the power lines or give adequate warning
of them to Plaintiff.
FACTS
The facts as they relate to the decision sought to be
reviewed are that the only reference to them in that decision is
as follows (from pages 8 and 9 ) :
"Lastly, we address the summary judgment
in favor of Durfee and Howell. Donahue's
claim against these two defendants is based
on their roles in procuring and supervising
the construction of the DVF warehouse,
including allowing the active power line to
remain so near the warehouse roof while
Donahue worked. Apparently, the only basis
for summary judgment in their favor was the
open and obvious nature of the danger posed
by the power line. As we held above, the
6

mere obviousness of danger does not support
summary judgment under these facts, and it
must also be reversed as to both Durfee and
Howell."
The facts as they relate to this petition are as
follows:
1.

Defendant Howell sells materials used in the

erection of metal buildings (Deposition of Larry Howell ["Howell
depo."] R 669, pp. 13-15).
2.

Defendant Howell at purchaser's request will

arrange for a licensed contractor to construct a building in
accordance with purchaser's plans and specifications using the
materials referred to in No. 1 above (Howell depo. R 669, p. 29).
3.

Defendant Howell at purchaser's request will act

as the agent for purchaser in obtaining the necessary building
permits to erect the building referred to above (Howell depo. R
669, p. 28).
4.

Defendant Howell sold to defendants Durfee and

Delta Valley Foods the materials contained in the building in
question and arranged for the construction contract between those
defendants and ABCO Construction Corporation (Howell depo. R 669,
pp. 53, 54) .
5.

Defendant Howell agreed with defendant Durfee to

have certain guttering installed on the subject building,
selected "Mr. Rain Gutter" from the Yellow Pages of the local
telephone directory to do the work for him as an independent
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contractor and paid the company for doing so (Howell depo. R 669,
pp. 81, 82).
ARGUMENT
The decision which is the subject matter of this
Petition is in conflict with this Court's decision in Ellertson
v. Dansie, 576 P2d 867 (Utah 1978) which upheld the "open and
obvious danger" doctrine struck down in the Court of Appeals.
The decision itself said that Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware
Co., 631 P2d 865 (Utah, 1981) "does cast doubt on the propriety
of our conclusion here" (p. 7, footnote 3 ) .
Said decision also so far departs from a correct
understanding of and application of the facts (treating Howell
as if he were an owner of property or one whose actions caused
the injury) that is accepted and usual in the course of judicial
proceeding as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of
supervision.
The decision in question ties the "open and obvious
dangers" doctrine to a contributory negligence system (see page
3) even though this Court's decision in Ellertson did not do so.
The latter case simply held that where the danger is "just as
observable to invitee as to the owner" there is "no duty to warn
or to protect the invitee" (p. 868). Therefore, absent a duty,
the first element of a negligence action (Williams v. Melbv, 699
P2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985) is not present and hence there is no
negligence with respect hereto in the first essential instance
and hence nothing to compare.
8

If the trial court was correct in determining that as a
matter of law the defendants (or any of them) are not liable,
then its judgment should be affirmed even if the assigned reason
("open and obvious danger") is not the correct reason for the
judgment being correct.
The Court of Appeals did not address any of the reasons
Howell urged for the affirmance of the summary judgment in the
District Court.

The reasons advanced in his brief there and

which he urges upon this Court appear as No. 2 in the Appendix.
In urging affirmance in said alternate grounds,
petitioner is not appealing from an adverse ruling on those
grounds, but respectfully points out that they have never been
addressed as the Court of Appeals did not apply the applicable
facts to the law.

The Court of Appeals simply did not address

those issues and should have done so.
CONCLUSION
For reasons set forth above petitioner respectfully
submits that this petition should be granted as the case is very
significant in settling Utah law with respect to "open and
obvious dangers".
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of October, 1989.

Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Respondent Howell
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Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
Plaintiff Patrick Donahue appeals the district court's
entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants Delta Valley
Foods ("DVF"), John Durfee, and Larry Howell. Donahue filed
this negligence action seeking to recover damages for injuries
he suffered when he contacted an electrical power line while
installing a rain gutter on DVF's warehouse. The district
court concluded the power line constituted an open and obvious
danger and, accordingly, DVF, Durfee, and Howell owed no duty
to warn Donahue of the danger or otherwise protect him from
it. We reverse and remand.

FACTS
Summary judgment is proper only where Hthere is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). "In reviewing a summary judgment, we analyze the facts
and inferences in a light most favorable to the losing party.CQPPQr State Lgaginq COt Vt Blagkgr Appliance fr Furniture COt/
770 P.2d 88, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Accordingly, we set
forth the facts as contended by Donahue.
John Durfee, DVF's general manager, hired Larry Howell, a
steel building salesman, to organize the construction of a new
warehouse for DVF. Howell's duties included procuring the
necessary building materials and locating a suitable
contractor. With Durfee's consent, Howell hired ABCO
Construction Corp. to erect the warehouse*
By spring of 1982, the warehouse was mostly complete and
Howell hired M Mr. Rain Gutter,H Donahue's employer, to install
a gutter to promote proper water drainage. On August 18, 1982,
Donahue was assigned to assist with the DVF warehouse project.
Donahue was required to work from atop the warehouse roof,
where a 7200 volt high-tension power line operated by Utah
Power and Light loomed approximately four to five feet
overhead. Apparently, Donahue stood up during the gutter's
installation and the top of his head struck the power line,
causing a severe electrical shock and his resulting fall from
the warehouse roof. Donahue was not warned about the powerline
but saw it and perceived the potentially fatal danger which it
posed.
In July of 1984, Donahue brought this negligence action
against DVF, Durfee, Howell, ABCO, and Utah Power and
Light.1 DVF, Durfee, and Howell moved for summary judgment,
contending they owed no duty to warn Donahue or otherwise
protect him from the power line as it constituted an open and
obvious danger. See, e.g., Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande W.
R.R., 16 Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751, 753-54 (1964). The
district court agreed and entered summary judgment in favor of
the defendants.
Donahue appeals, advancing several related arguments.
However, the dispositive issue on appeal is whether the open
and obvious danger rule is an absolute bar to Donahue's action
under Utah's comparative negligence system. We hold that even
1. Donahue entered into settlements with ABCO and Utah Power
and Light, and they are not parties to this appeal.
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assuming the power line was an open and obvious danger, Donahue
is nonetheless entitled to have the finder of fact compare his
negligence, if any, in encountering the power line with any
negligence attributable to the defendants in creating or
allowing such a dangerous condition to exist.
We first address this issue as it pertains to Donahue's
claim against DVF based on its ownership of the warehouse.
TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO LANDOWNER LIABILITY
Historically, a landowner's duty of care owing to persons
entering his or her land varied with the nature of the visit.
£££/ g_*_g., Tias v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah 1979). But
see Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985)
(abandoning the traditional common law distinctions and instead
imposing a duty of "reasonable care in all circumstances," at
least toward the landowner's tenant). Accord English v.
Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Gregory v.
Fourthwest Invs., Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Under the traditional view a landowner has no duty to warn
guests of "open and obvious dangers," regardless of the purpose
of the visit. See, e.g., Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867,
868 (Utah 1978); Steele, 396 P.2d at 753-54. This doctrine is
commonly known as the open and obvious danger rule, and it
precludes an injured guest's recovery against the landowner for
any injuries sustained through encountering an obvious risk.
The justification for the rule appears to be that encountering
an obvious risk is negligence as a matter of law and, at least
under a contributory negligence system, a plaintiff who is even
only slightly negligent is barred from recovery. An alternative
justification is that while a landowner has a duty to warn
guests of dangers on his or her property, the landowner's
failure to do so is harmless where the danger is readily
apparent.
The open and obvious danger rule has been sharply
criticized. An often-cited basis for attack is that the rule
establishes the landowner's duty of care according to what is
known or should be known by the guest. See, e.g., Keller v.
Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 671 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Ct.
App, 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d
1208 (1984). These critics argue that a more logical approach
treats the guest's knowledge of obvious danger as bearing only
on the reasonableness of the guest's subsequent conduct, not as
relieving the landowner of its duty of care. See, e.g.,
Keller, 671 P.2d at 1117 (the open and obvious danger rule does
not differentiate between those facts relevant to the
landowner's duty of care and those facts establishing a total
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or partial defense to liability); Parker v. Highland Park,
Inc. , 565 S.W.2d 512, 521 (Tex. 1978) (HA plaintiffs
knowledge, whether it is derived from a warning or from the
facts, even if the facts display the danger openly and
obviously, is a matter that bears upon [plaintiff's] own
negligence; it should not affect the defendant's duty. H ).
Others have criticized the open and obvious danger rule for
ignoring reality. As the Texas Supreme Court observed,
[t]here are many instances in which a person
of ordinary prudence may prudently take a
risk about which he knows, or has been
warned about, or that is open and obvious to
him. . . . One's conduct after he is
possessed of full knowledge, under the
circumstances may be justified or deemed
negligent depending on such things as the
plaintiff's status, the nature of the
structure, the urgency or lack of it for
attempting to reach a destination, the
availability of an alternative, one's
familiarity or lack of it with the way, the
degree and seriousness of the danger, the
availability of aid from others, the nature
and degree of darkness, the kind and extent
of a warning, and the precautions taken
under the circumstances . . . .
Parker, 565 S.W.2d at 520. Se£ Keller, 671 P.2d at 1117.
Courts subscribing to this view have either completely
abandoned the open and obvious danger rule, as did Texas in
Parker, or, at a minimum, refuse to apply the rule as an
absolute bar in actions brought by plaintiffs who, like
Donahue, entered the property in connection with their
employment duties. See, e.g., Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd.,
536 F.2d 505, 509 (2nd Cir. 1976) (a vessel owner must
anticipate that a longshoreman may voluntarily encounter an
obvious danger to avoid losing his job); Brown v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 690 P.2d 889, 892 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (where
an employee's duty renders an obvious danger unavoidable,
injured employee is not barred as a matter of law from recovery
against landowner); Shannon v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co.,
181 Mont. 269, 593 P.2d 438, 440-41 (1979) (where an employee
must either forego employment or encounter danger, the
obviousness of the danger will not completely bar the
employee's recovery for any resulting injury).
A related approach is articulated in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1965). Section 343A provides that a
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landowner is not liable for a guest's injuries resulting from
an open and obvious danger unless the landowner Hshould
anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness." A
few jurisdictions, apparently including Utah, have seen merit
in this approach. See, e.g., Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 16
Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918, 920 (1964) ("In order to justify
holding that a jury question as to negligence exists, where
injury has resulted from an observable hazard, it is essential
•that there be something wnicn could be regarded as tending to
distract the [injured person'si attention or to prevent him
from seeing the danger . . . . " ) ; bantos v. Scinoia Steam
Navigation Co., b^8 F.2a 480 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying
Restatement approach under Jones Act), aff'd, 451 U.S. 156
(1981); Scales v. St. Louis-San Francisco Rv. Co., 2 Kan. App.
2d 491, 582 P.2d 300, 306 (1978) (a landowner may be liable for
injuries suffered by a worker encountering an obviously
dangerous condition during periods of foreseeable distraction).
Thus, the open and obvious danger rule is not beyond
reproach even within the contributory negligence system from
which it arose.
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK
Utah has now abandoned its contributory negligence system.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1987), entitled "Comparative
Negligence," provides in part that H[t]he fault of a person
seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that person.
He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose
fault exceeds his own." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(2) defines
"fault" as "any actionable breach of legal duty . . .
including, but not limited to, negligence in all its degrees,
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, . . . ." We hold
that by enacting the above statutory provisions and
establishing a comparative negligence system, the Utah
Legislature has by necessary implication abolished the open and
obvious danger rule as an absolute bar to an injured guest's
recovery. Our conclusion is premised on two grounds.
First, the open and obvious danger rule is fundamentally
incompatible with a comparative negligence scheme, which
requires the finder of fact to allocate liability for an injury
based on the relative responsibility of the parties involved.
The adoption of a comparative negligence system amounts to an
expression by the Legislature that the harsh and inflexible
result of total victory or unconditional defeat compelled by
the traditional contributory negligence system, including the
open and obvious danger rule, is no longer acceptable. As most
convincingly articulated by Judge Burnett for the Idaho Court
of Appeals,

880227-CA

[p]rior to the advent of comparative
negligence, contributory negligence was an
absolute bar to recovery. Thus, it made
little difference whether a known or
obvious condition excused a land
possessor's duty to an invitee, or simply
insulated the possessor from liability for
any breach of such duty. But under the
comparative negligence system, the
difference is profound. If duty is not
excused by a known or obvious danger, the
injured invitee might recover, albeit in a
diminished amount, if his negligence in
encountering the risk is found to be less
than the land possessor's negligence in
allowing the dangerous condition or
activity on his property. In contrast, if
the invitee's voluntary encounter with a
known or obvious danger were deemed to
excuse the landowner's duty, then there
would be no negligence to compare—and,
therefore, no recovery. The effect would
be to resurrect contributory negligence as
an absolute bar to recovery in cases
involving a land possessor's liability to
invitees.
Keller, 671 P.2d at 1118-19. See also 0'Donne11 v. Citv of
Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1281-82 (Wyo. 1985). While the Idaho
Supreme Court did not immediately embrace Judge Burnett's
entire analysis, see Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho
593, 691 P.2d 1208, 1210-11 (1984) (limiting the basis for
court of appeals holding), the court ultimately adopted that
view and abandoned the open and obvious danger rule altogether,
citing its incompatibility with Idaho's comparative negligence
system. See Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321,
1325 (1989). In abandoning the traditional rule, the court
noted that M[w]e recognize the role stare decisis plays in the
judicial process. But we are not hesitant to reverse ourselves
when a doctrine . . . has proven over time to be unjust or
unwise." Id. at 1328. We are likewise convinced that the open
and obvious danger rule is incompatible with Utah's comparative
negligence system and join Idaho and a number of other states
in announcing its abandonment.2 See, e.g., Cox v. J.C.
2. The middle ground taken by the Idaho Supreme Court in
Keller, namely that of recognizing an exception for injured
employees rather than rejecting outright the open and obvious
danger doctrine, is not without attraction as a more cautious
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Penney Co., 741 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); Woolston v.
Wells. 297 Or. 548, 687 P.2d 144 (1984); Parker, 565 S.W.2d at
517; O'Donnell, 696 P.2d at 1284.
Our second point of analysis is premised upon the fact
that the assumption of risk doctrine has been expressly
abandoned in Utah as a complete bar to recovery due to its
incompatibility with our comparative negligence system. See
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(2) (1987). See also Moore y. Burton
Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 870 (Utah 1981);3
Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite Bna'q, Inc..
619 P.2d 306,
309 (Utah 1980). Accord Peats v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 746
P.2d 1191, 1193-94 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). It would defy
rationality to maintain the open and obvious danger rule as a
complete bar to recovery where the essentially
indistinguishable assumption of risk doctrine no longer compels
such a result. See, e.g., Harrison, 768 P.2d at 1325 (open and
obvious danger rule is a corollary to the assumption of risk
doctrine and should likewise be abandoned); Parker, 565 S.W.2d
at 518 (assumption of risk doctrine is inseparable from the
(footnote 2 continued)
and conservative approach to the law's development. However,
there is no defensible basis for making such fine distinctions
in view of our conclusion that the open and obvious danger
rule, at least as a total bar to liability, has been
legislatively washed away with the enactment in this state of a
comparative negligence scheme. And as discussed in the text,
the Idaho court reached this very conclusion in Harrison only
five years after its decision in Keller.
3. In Moore, 631 P.2d at 868, the Utah Supreme Court also held
the defendant landowner was entitled to a jury instruction that
he has no duty to warn a business invitee of an obvious danger,
but the failure to give such an instruction under the
particular facts was held to be harmless error. This result
does cast doubt on the propriety of our conclusion here. While
our Supreme Court recognized in Moore that the assumption of
risk doctrine has been abandoned as a complete bar to recovery
under sections 78-27-37 and -38, it failed to consider the
effect of those provisions on the open and obvious danger rule,
most likely because that point was not argued by the parties.
631 P.2d at 870. We believe that had the parties in Moore
analyzed the open and obvious danger rule in this light, the
Court would have held that there are no significant differences
between it and the assumption of risk doctrine, abandoning both
under our comparative negligence system.
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open and obvious danger rule). See also Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-37(2) (1987) (defining "fault" for purposes of the
comparative negligence scheme as including -assumption of riskand "negligence in all its degrees").
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted section
78-27-37(2) to abolish the last clear chance doctrine as a
complete bar to recovery.
It is widely recognized that such
doctrines as assumption of risk, last
clear chance, and discovered peril
resemble the old contributory negligence
doctrine in that they are -all or nothingdoctrines in terms of recovery by the
plaintiff . . . .
[T]here seem to be no good reasons to
retain [the last clear chance] doctrine
which was originally devised because of
another doctrine, i.e., contributory
negligence, which the state of Utah has
statutorily abolished as an absolute bar
to recovery.
Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 1982) (emphasis
added). We likewise find no good reasons to retain the open
and obvious danger rule as an absolute bar to recovery. The
summary judgment against Donahue and in favor of DVF must
accordingly be reversed.4
JUDGMENT AGAINST OTHER DEFENDANTS
Lastly, we address the summary judgment in favor of Durfee
and Howell. Donahue's claim against these two defendants is
based on their roles in procuring and supervising the
4. Our decision in this case will no doubt narrow somewhat the
range of cases involving landowner liability in which summary
judgment will be appropriate. However, summary judgment will
still be available, even though the landowner will be unable to
take refuge behind the open and obvious danger doctrine, in
situations where the landowner establishes undisputed facts
showing he was not negligent as a matter of law. Such
situations include plaintiffs who are solely responsible for
creating the dangerous condition on defendant's land. E.g.,
English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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construction of the DVF warehouse, including allowing the
active power line to remain so near the warehouse roof while
Donahue worked. Apparently, the only basis for summary
judgment in their favor was the open and obvious nature of the
danger posed by the power line. As we held above, the mere
obviousness of danger does not support summary judgment under
these facts, and it must also be reversed as to both Durfee and
Howell.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the summary judgment and remand this matter for
trial or such other proceedings as may be appropriate
consistent with this opinion. At trial, the finder of fact
must compare the reasonableness of Donahue's conduct under all
the circumstances in encountering the power line with the
reasonableness of DVF's, Durfee's, and Howell's conduct in
creating and allowing the potentially deadly power line to
remain so near the warehouse roof, in an activated state, while
work was being done on the roof. If any damages are warranted
under this analysis, they must be awarded consistent with Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1987), as discussed above. The parties
will bear their own costs of this appeal*

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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APPENDIX NO. 2

ARGUMENT
A.

DEFENDANT HOWELL HAD NO DUTY OF CARE TOWARD

PLAINTIFF
In order for any defendant to be liable in a negligence
case the defendant must owe a duty to the plaintiff, 57 Am Jur 2d
378, 379 (Negligence, Sec. 33). Did the defendant Howell owe a
duty to the plaintiff?
Plaintiff's first statement on this point under
Argument "Afl is the "Defendants breached their duty of care to
plaintiff when they constructed a metal building too close to an
existing energized high-tension electric wire, which resulted in
the creation of an unreasonably dangerous working environment."
(p.8)

The fact is the defendant Howell did not build the

subject building at all (his only involvement was to assist the
owner in arranging for others to build the building).
The second statement on this point is in the next
sentence where it says "Defendant's actions" violated a cited
regulation.

The defendant Howell was not involved in the

"actions referred to (building the building too close for safety)
so could not have violated said regulation.

In addition the

regulation expressly confers the duty on "the employer."

Since

defendant Howell was not the employer of the plaintiff even under
the broad definition set forth on page 9 to include "every

person, firm and private corporation who have workmen employed at
the construction site" (since defendant employed no one who was
at the construction site, the cited regulation did not create any
duty on this defendant^
The fourth and final basis asserted by plaintiff as an
"alternative" basis for a duty of care toward plaintiff is that
of a "business invitee."

After citing two Utah cases (Glenn v.

Gibbons & Reed Co., 265 P.2d 1019, Utah 1954 and Williams v.
Melby, 699 P.2d 723, Utah 1985) which did not involve liability
of a non property owner such as defendant Howell is in this case,
plaintiff cites Prosser on the duties "upon owners and occupiers
of land."

Since defendant Howell was neither an owner or

occupier of the land in question there is no basis for imposing
any duty on him based on the principles of a "business invitee."
B.

DEFENDANT HOWELL HAD NO AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO WARN

PLAINTIFF BASED ON EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP OR OTHERWISE.
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion on page 5, defendant
Howell did not hire the plaintiff to do the guttering work in
question.

He was hired to do that by his employer Eugene

Strickland (Deposition of Patrick Donahue, pages 136, 137).
The only other basis suggested in plaintiff's brief for
an affirmative duty to warn plaintiff was defendant Howell's
observing the power lines in question about three months prior to
the accident (page 12). No legal precedent to sustain liability
on such a basis has been cited and the defendant submits none

exists (See Section 41 of Negligence in 57 Am Jur 2d 389
captioned "Moral or humanitarian considerations; duty to aid or
protect others" where it states:
As a general rule, the law imposed no
duty on one person actively to assist in the
preservation of the person or property of
another from injury, even though the means by
which harm can be averted are in his
possession. The law does not undertake to
make men render active service to their
neighbors at all times because a good or
brave man would do so.
If such knowledge alone is a predicate for liability,
Earl Dickman, Douglas Stout and Darrell Martin who also saw those
lines some three weeks prior to the accident (and long after
defendant Howell saw them over a month before) should also have
been sued individually and they were not.
C.

ANY NEGLIGENCE ON PART OF DEFENDANT HOWELL WAS

SUPERSEDED BY SUBSEQUENT NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THIRD PARTIES
SO AS NOT TO BE A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURIES.
Defendant Howell acquired knowledge of the danger which
later caused the tragedy in question on May 19, 1981 (page 12 of
Plaintiff's Brief).

Over a month later two officials of Utah

Power & Light Company discussed the particular danger with an
employee of the other defendants (pages 5, 6 of Plaintiff's
Brief).

Certainly those officials were in the best position of

anyone to have caused the subject lines to be elevated and the
danger completely removed.

An independent subsequent act of

negligence is generally a superseding cause which precludes the

initial negligence from being a proximate cause (Corpus Juris
Secundum expresses the law as follows in Section 28 of Torts (p.
943) :
There, in the sequence of events between
the original default and the final results,
an entirely independent unforeseen cause
intervenes sufficient to stand as the cause
of the mischief, the second cause is
ordinarily regarded as the proximate, and the
other as the remote, cause.
Defendant Howell directs the Court's attention to the
following parts of Plaintiff's Brief to consider in connection
with the arguments for liability therein set forth:
1.

Plaintiff states in argument "A" that

"DEFENDANTS... CONSTRUCTED AND MAINTAINED A BUILDING

"

It is clear from the facts that defendant Howell did
not construct (ABCO did) or maintain the subject building (Delta
Foods did).

At most it can be said that he assisted the

defendant owner in doing so.

Since Argument "A" is obviously

based on facts that are erroneous, the conclusion is likewise
faulty.
2.

The plaintiff in lumping defendant Howell into

"defendants" implies that he comes within the broad definition of
"employer" so as to be subject to the regulation on safety cited
on page 8.

No proof exists in the record, however, that this

defendant ever had any "workmen employed at a construction site."
To contend that plaintiff had been employed by this defendant is
to confuse a purchaser of the services of an independent

contractor with one who purchases the services of workers as an
employer.

To extend employers' duties to consumers would render

a vast portion of our population liable for acts of businesses
they have no power to control.
3.

The implication of the quotation on page 11 is

that the defendant Howell had the duty "incumbent upon owners and
occupiers of land."

Nothing exists in the record to impose such

duties on this defendant as he had no ownership interest in or
right of possession over the subject building.
4.

Under Argument "B" plaintiff cites the Briqham

case where the injured party is a ten year old boy.

That fact

certainly ought to disqualify it as persuasive regarding an adult
worker with respect to "open and obvious dangers."
5.

The deposition quotation of plaintiff on page 18

obviously conflicts with his quotation on the next page where he
says "I'm always careful around power lines" but even if the
former is determined to be correct (that he can't distinguish
between the types of lines) that is more reason, rather then
less, why he should stay entirely clear of any lines since the
former proved he was aware that both kinds exist while the later
makes it clear he knew power lines were dangerous.
6.

Much is made on pages 18 and 19 that the warning

given by defendant Durfee was general rather than specific.
should be noted, however, that this warning was given to an
expert, to wit plaintiff's employer, not to plaintiff.

To

It

presume that the expert in turn did not make the warning to
plaintiff specific is not justifiable.

As noted in 5 above,

however, plaintiff was aware of the danger of power lines
independent of whatever plaintiff's employer said to him and thus
a specific warning would not have created an awareness where none
existed before.
CONCLUSIONS
1.

Defendant Howell had no duty, affirmative or

otherwise, upon which liability could be predicted.
2.

Any negligence of defendant Howell was not the

cause of plaintiff's injuries because of intervening negligence
on part of third parties.

